Men have continually shaped their communal life as exaction. Their social relations exist as a mesh of command and subordination, dominance and obedience, exploitation and submission, power and alienation. Philosophers, of course, maintain that the orders of inequality which originate in this way are natural; but Utopias manifest the mistrust of such a doctrine from the outset. The dream of social justice interferes with the reality of hierarchically structured societies. It makes the lower classes malcontent and the upper classes talkative. Occasionally the former express their annoyance in insurrections and revolts; the latter regularly narrate about the beauty and expediency of difference. In doing so they put up with a limited stock of metaphors. Common motifs delineate society as being a ship or a body. Both should make understandable that social life requires supremacy. A ship without a captain starts pitching. A body without a head loses orientation.¹

The narration about the functionality of the hierarchically structured whole includes ideas concerning the inequality of its parts. The limbs of the body and the members of the crew are not considered as being equivalent. The social legend of the shared identity of unequal individuals is combined with myths about their descent. In Athens all citizens were to be convinced that they were members of the polis and therefore relatives. Nevertheless, they were to be divided into classes because the gods had added gold, silver, or iron to them appropriate to their social function. In Peru it was said that the sun had hatched out human beings from three different eggs: the chiefs from a golden egg, their wives from a silver one, and all the men and women of the labouring classes from a copper one.²

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¹ All quotations from other than English sources have been translated. Italics or similar emphases in the originals are not included.

Lineage is not available without descent. What gods should have concocted ages ago, men must pursue as reproduction. Gender relations determined by power provide the model for the racist interpretation of social relations. This does not refer to individuals but to groups; it derives social inequality from natural differences; it emphasizes the visibility of otherness; it combines biological attributes with cultural abilities; it arranges differences hierarchically and classifies them with greater or lesser esteem.

According to this women should be a separate race. Hesiod considers Pandora as being their ancestress and declares: “from her is the race [génos] of women and female kind”. Plato threatens cowards among men, saying they are to be reborn in the genus [génos] of women. Aristotle maintains that daughters are engendered when a man’s semen does not succeed in the act of procreation. Because the girls do not take after their fathers, Aristotle views them as being malformed and as a deviation from the species [génos].

With different ideological slips of the tongue such statements are to be found in the entire occidental history of ideas. They connect biological with cultural arguments to justify a hierarchy of social groups. The gradation of genders gets transferred to class structure and to outward political relations. The attributes of differing degrees of being human – permeated by dominance – form the core of racist discrimination.

This does not mean that it would be impossible to differentiate the various forms of such discrimination. First of all, racism is just one element combined with other elements as far as the constructions of genders, classes, nations, races or cultures are concerned. Furthermore they have been developed under historically specific conditions so that racist discrimination using the modern concept of races, for example, is not congruent with the racist discrimination of barbarians. In addition, it is necessary and possible to describe racisms in classist discriminations of caste societies, estate societies and class societies in their respective peculiarities.

This opinion is by no means universally shared in the theory of racism. In particular, three problem complexes are controversial. First, there is no agreement upon whether or not racism existed before the development of the category of race. Second, there is no consensus that racism is not due to the existence of the others. Third, the similarities and differences of sexist, classist, nationalist, culturalist and racist discrimination are determined in a different way.


4 Even these days scientists defend the opinion that “male and female beings” are “two different species” (Wolfgang Wickler, Die Natur der Geschlechterrollen. Ursachen und Folgen der Sexualität, in: Norbert A. Luyten (ed.), Wesen und Sinn der Geschlechtlichkeit. Freiburg im Breisgau 1985, 67-102, 83) and social scientists are mad about the difference between cultures which were as “incomparable” as “man and woman” (Frank Böckelmann, Die Gelben, die Schwarzen, die Weißen. Frankfurt am Main 1998, 450).
Regarding the historical dimensions of racism, advocates of the race concept are much more convinced of their views than are their critics. Proceeding from the assumption that races are a product of nature, they place them beyond society anyway and look upon them as trans-historical quantities. That is why they are convinced that mankind has always split up into races. Where these came into contact and cultural systems of documentation existed, nomenclatures of race should already have developed at an early period. According to this, the ancient Egyptians should have divided mankind into black, brown, yellow and white, and thus made a "decisive step on the way to a systematic classification of races". Illustrations portraying people with differing clothes, hairstyles, and skin colour are considered to be "descriptions of race by the ancient Egyptians". In reality, the differentiation in colour expressed their experience during the expansion of the realm to the south. The Egyptians came into contact with people of increasingly darker skin colour. They did not, however, draw any categorical conclusions from this but labelled them all as Nehesi [nḥs], i.e. Southerners. This term had no ethnic connotations but was simply oriented towards geographical circumstances. This example shows that the Egyptians differentiated human beings and peoples according to their origin and appearance but in so doing did not divide them up into races. The perception of difference did not lead to categorical differentiation. People with different skin colour were described jointly as being Southerners and were not separated by race.

On the other hand, examples from India, China, and Greece show that racist operations make do without any definition of race. An early justification of caste society in India is to be found in the Rgveda. It makes use of the image of the social body, and causes the social classes to emerge from the body of the primeval being Puruṣa. The priests [brāhmans] originate from his head, the warriors [kṣatriyas] from his arms, the farmers and craftsmen [vaiṣyas] from his thighs, and the servants [śūdras] from his feet. These groups are described with the word varna – biological and sociological at the same time – which means colour or appearance and which stands for caste. This term expresses a natural otherness as well as a cultural difference. What this demarcation does inwardly the Chinese demarcation does outwardly. Although not using one single term, this demarcation is resolute in the inclusion of those who are on the inside [chung, nei], and in the exclusion of those who are on the outside [wai] and who are labelled barbarians of the four quarters of heaven. The characteristics ascribed to them have been handed down for centuries. They are oriented towards cultural aspects [wen – script, culture], and thus permit the concept of the possibility of culturally assimilating the barbarians. But at the same time they also have long been combined with comparisons to animals. In political

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and ideological conflicts they often take on an openly racist character with fantasies of suppression and extermination.\textsuperscript{6} 

In ancient Greece, racist exclusion was not primarily concerned with the foreigner (\textit{xénos}), not even when he came from Africa and had a dark skin (\textit{aithiops}).\textsuperscript{7} It was concerned with the barbarian (\textit{barbaros}) constructed as an eternal enemy and thus legitimised his being used as a slave (\textit{doulos}). It is true that “[…]there are no exactly racial exclusions in the classical Greek social formation, for there is no racial conception of the social subject”.\textsuperscript{8} But from this it does not follow that there are no racist exclusions which do not depend on race and not even on the real visibility of otherness. The relevant definition of the slave by nature dispenses with external verification. Aristotle combines real slavery with supposed abilities in a shamelessly vicious circle: “anyone who, though human, belongs by nature not to himself but to another is by nature a slave”.\textsuperscript{9} The difference between master and slave is said to be as great as that “between soul and body or between man and beast”. In this context, Aristotle certainly underlines “nature’s purpose to make the bodies […] of freemen and of slaves different”. But his categorical determinations allow him to concede realistically that this often goes wrong and that the cultural deficiency of the slaves is not to be seen in their corporality.
It is part of the misery of racism as a “visual ideology”\textsuperscript{10} to be confronted with such imperfection from the very beginning. There have always been problems in visualising the otherness of the others. Not least, the example of anti-Semitism elucidates this. Its defamations at an early point in time started to use iconographic characteristics and decreed the use of badges. And even when it claimed in modernity to be able to measure and describe the features of a Jewish race by means of craniology and physiognomy it had the cheek to claim that the Jews had the ability to alter their appearance like chameleons in order to adapt to their milieu.

From the beginning, the history of anti-Semitism illustrates the difficulties of one of the central practices of racist discrimination: the alienation of the others. The Fathers of the Church had already made a great effort in the production of distance between Judaism and Christianity.\textsuperscript{11} The Spanish policy of the purity of blood [limpieza de sangre] was destined to exclude any Christian who had Jewish blood and tried to join universities, military and religious orders, city councils, confraternities or the Inquisition. The applied procedure was the search for Jewish ancestors which went back for generations. Alleged hereditary qualities of the blood were declared to be carriers of irrevocable strangeness; “Jewishness, then, was not a statement of faith or even a series of ethnic practices but a biological consideration”.\textsuperscript{12} At this point, even committed advocates of the thesis that racism is a phenomenon of modernity hesitate. Some of them push back the “birth” of “racism” to the year “1492”. Several others concede that the politics of the purity of blood would be “proto-racism” at least – if not actually “racism in a modern sense” but as a historical exception. Occasionally it is suggested to make a distinction between a gentile racism of antiquity, an anthropological racism of modernity and a genea-

\textsuperscript{10} George L. Mosse, Die Geschichte des Rassismus in Europa. Frankfurt am Main 1990, 9; concerning the following see Heinz Schreckenberg, Die Juden in der Kunst Europas. Göttingen/Freiburg im Breisgau 1996 [ref. iconography of anti-Semitism]; Annegret Kiefer, Das Problem einer „jüdischen Rasse”. Eine Diskussion zwischen Wissenschaft und Ideologie (1870–1930). Frankfurt am Main 1991 [ref. anthropology, anti-Semitism and “Jewish race”]; Werner Sombart, Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben. Leipzig 1911, on the one hand underlines a so-called “anthropological homogeneity of the Jewish tribe” (346), on the other hand he maintains that Jews are able to assume by a sort of “mimicry” even the “corporeity” (327) they want to have.


\textsuperscript{12} Jerome Friedman, Jewish Conversion, the Spanish Pure Blood Laws and Reformation: A Revisionist View of Racial and Religious Antisemitism, in: The Sixteenth Century Journal 18 (1987) 3-29, 16; cf. Norman Roth, Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain. Madison, Wisc./London 1995, 230: “the anti-Semitism which was directed in the latter part of the fifteenth century against the conversos was launched on two fronts, or with two ends: first, the extermination of as many as possible under the false pretense that they were “bad Christians”; and second, the social isolation and persecution of those who could not be burned, by the doctrine of their racial inferiority […]. The parallels with modern anti-Semitic manifestations are too ob- vious to need comment”.  

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logical racism of the Middle Ages, and to grasp with the latter category the persecution of the converts [conversos] in Spain.13

This, at the latest, makes unmistakably clear the necessity to analyse historically specified racisms not only with regard to the history of modern racism, but in the extensive historical framework of hierarchically structured societies. Definitions which tie racism to the development of the term race restrict the viewpoint of historical analysis. Even in the narrow framework of modernity there are differently marked racisms. And just in this context the discussion has ascertained the disappearance of the category of race accompanied by the continuation of the concept of racism.14 Amongst others, the example of anti-Semitism suggests that it is necessary to hold the discussion just topical as well as retroactive. Nature did not give rise to race. But mankind began early to legitimize social conditions formed by dominance and power with reference to supposed natural inequalities. Biological and cultural arguments have been interwoven in this process from the beginning. The ideological shape of these arguments differs with respect to the concrete historical conditions and to the various areas of discrimination.

Regarding the reference point of racism, however, there is no consent, whether it refers to the other as an alien or to the alienated other. Until today the view is held that race is a scientific category that reflects natural differences between human beings, whereas racism is a dogma that classifies racial differences hierarchically.15 This perspective has been opposed vehemently only recently by the argument that “the use of the word ‘race’ […] is an aspect of the social construction of reality: ‘races’ are socially imagined rather than biological realities”.16


15 Cf. Ruth Benedict, Die Rassenfrage in Wissenschaft und Politik. Bergen 1947, 131 f. (original English edition: Race: Science and Politics. New York 1940), Almost half a century later Immanuel Geiss, Geschichte des Rassismus, maintains that “race” would describe physical elements (17 f.), the differences of “Caucasians, Mongoloid and Negroid” (23); racism, however, would argue that these differences are not only outward but also imply “unchanging mental abilities” (21).

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Nevertheless, the essentialist race concept continues to exist. It is still disseminated by influential encyclopaedias and dictionaries, can be found in frequently-used school books, and is included in relevant anthropological textbooks. Even at the end of the 20th century a long and massive political and academic effort was necessary to stop its catchy visual representation in the Race Gallery of Vienna’s Natural History Museum.17 Up to the present, anthropologists claim that they are capable of describing and measuring racial differences. Yet essentialist ideas do not survive in relics of race research alone. Moreover, they are perpetuated in numerous regulations against discrimination including even legislation and state constitutions.18 Furthermore, they have survived in diverse combinations with cultural arguments.19 In the discussion of racism, they can be found in concepts that operate with a socially interpreted category of race which is, however, founded on a biologically justified understanding of ethnocentrism.20

Those theoretical considerations which understand race as a social construction firmly reject its biological reification. But they do not agree on whether race has to be understood as a social fact, discursive metaphor, ideology, invention, or something similar.21 The discussions related to this discord are partly illuminating, partly over-subtle, partly

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17 Cf. Marek Kohn, The Race Gallery. The Return of Racial Science. London 1995, esp. 13-17; the concept of such a sort of exhibition continues to exist – Kenan Malik, The Meaning of Race. Race, History and Culture in Western Society. Basingstoke/New York 1998, 3, states: “In recent years the arguments of writers […] who reject entirely the use of race as a sociological category, have gained ground. Nevertheless, traditional arguments about race dominate academic discourse” – cf. e. g. Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism. Principles for a Multiracial Society. New York 1995, 449: “Of course racial classifications are variable in that they involve a human decision to categorize […], but it does not follow that these classifications do not describe real differences in genetic composition (genotype) or its manifestations (phenotype).”

18 Cf. Michael Banton, Progress in Ethnic and Racial Studies, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 (2001) 173-194, 184, mentions a dilemma resulting from the propagation of the category race: “Some elements of the racial idiom are still needed in law […] the concept of a racial group is the price to be paid for a law against indirect discrimination. They are needed in social policy for combating discrimination and prejudice, while others of them are useful to the victim groups.”

19 Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London/New York/Sydney 1998, 129 f., maintains that “identity at any level – personal, tribal, racial, civilizational – can only be defined in relation to an ‘other’”. From this he concludes: “The civilizational ‘us’ and extracivilizational ‘them’ is a constant in human history”. The other is regarded not only as a stranger but also as a threat. At the end of such a line of reasoning is the maxim: “For self-definition […] people need enemies.”


Wulf D. Hund, Inclusion and Exclusion

dogmatic and partly needless. In any case they refer to the necessity of an intensified historical investigation of racism. This would have to follow the complexity of the construction of races as well as to explore how racisms that get along without the category of race define their subject. While the literature referring to this is rather scanty to date, the development of the concept of race and the growth of modern racism related to it has been investigated in profound studies. In a range of topics these studies clarify, among other things, the origin and development of images of the other.

The frequently used criterion of skin colour, for example, once looked at more precisely, turns out to be too iridescent to present an appropriate measure for alleged natural differences. Particularly with respect to this criterion, the ostensible agreement of race sciences with nature is revealed as being a social construction. This applies to the present use of colour attributions as well as to their history.

Stuart Hall, who grew up in Jamaica, didn’t hear anything about black skin colour in his youth. His grandmother, though, was able to “differentiate about fifteen different shades between light brown and dark brown”. Yet this did not have anything to do with an accurate classification of natural differences but was related rather to a highly complex system of social stratification that was commonly understood and employed. “Black” was “not a question of pigmentation”, but it was “a political category”. Myrna Tonkinson also lived in Jamaica and was used to seeing innumerable shades of skin colour, too. During her studies in North America, skin colour was regarded as a dichotomy and she “became part of a disadvantaged minority”. She then lived in Canberra, Australia, where she was viewed as being an exotic black. In Western Australia, where she worked as an anthropologist, the Aborigines made no fuss about her skin colour. But in certain situations, she as a “black woman”, was called “whitefella” because to them she was included in the culture of the privileged.

Such a cultural background determined the history of race division orientated by skin colour as a whole. When the Europeans developed their concept of humankind divided by colour, they knew that sensory conception was not reliable. Travellers to East Asia

\[\text{Gegenrassismen. Konstruktionen – Interaktionen – Interventionen. Hamburg/Berlin 1999, 11-51, 17: ‘‘Races do not exist. […] ‘Race’ is a discursive metaphor […] and no ‘natural’ fact’, Robert Miles, Racism, 89: ‘‘races […] are imagined, […] they have no real biological foundation’; They ‘are the product of human invention’; Michael Omi/Howard Winant, Reflections on ‘Racial Formation’, in: Philomena Essed/David Theo Goldberg (eds.), Race Critical Theories, 455-459, 459: ‘While race may be a meaningless biological category, it continues to be an enduring social one’.


described the Chinese as white. The conquerors of North America characterized the Indians as being of a fair colour and added that they acquired a darker complexion only due to their continually being out in the open. That Americans and Asians, nevertheless were classified into the red and the yellow races respectively, does not mean that the original considerations were wrong nor that the later ones were right. It does not mean either that the older experience must be regarded as being naively correct and the newer one as being ideologically calculating. The change in perception was based on social and conceptual developments in connection with the unfolding of European colonialism and the transatlantic slave trade.

This led to a new assessment of Africans in the European world view. The Ethiopians of antiquity and the Moors of the Middle Ages were transformed into the Negroes of modernity. The criteria of skin colour and slavery were linked into a discriminating conglomerate that was finally legitimized scientifically by the development of the concept of race. Only the connection of a sensed dark skin colour with a maintained slavish nature directed by interest sharpened the view of the Europeans concerning the people of other regions and the nuances of their skin colour. The complexion of the Chinese and the American Indians was newly assessed. Differences that had been considered insignificant before developed so as to become the foundation of categorical differentiation. The emphasis of mutuality was replaced by the stress of dissimilarity.24

A comparable, astonishing argumentative inversion can be found in the development of the Gypsy stereotype. It applies to groups of migrants towards Western Europe who were marked as heathens, Tartars, Egyptians, Bohemians or Gypsies. For some, these labels reflected differences in appearance and language. Especially because of the presumed way of life of these groups which was comparable with that of travelling groups and vagrants, the reports about the so-called Gypsies, however, increasingly tended to question their alleged strangeness. Finally, these labels even did not allow to accept their language and skin colour as being authentic. They were sure that the claimed strangers were in fact riffraff gathered from the neighbourhood who artificially produced the appearance of strangeness. Alleged Gypsies were accused of darkening their skin with ointments and tinctures in order to get alms more easily and to beg under the cloak of being exotics. Their language was thought to be pure arrangement, a thieves’ cant in order to cook up swindle without being understood by anyone but themselves. The Enlightenment racialised the category Gypsy. It shaped peoples, previously regarded as lazy idlers and straying vagabonds, into nomads who had not even settled down somewhere and who would never reach the developed stage of cultivation.25

The transformations of skin colour and ways of life indicate a process of race construction and racialisation. This does not draw comparisons, but shapes strangeness. The construction of the alienated other veils the alienation of oneself. The patterns of dominance and subordination which are expressed in this construction contain legitimizing explanations. The alienated other is thought to be inferior by nature. This is the crux of racist discrimination. It is connected with different relations of dependence. The process of othering covers all relations determined by power.

Regarding the relations of race, class, gender, nation, and culture, there are more and more references concerning the connection and overlapping of these categories. They manifest themselves in the theses “that racist exclusion is the ratio cognoscendi of classist exclusion” and in the opinion that there is “no difference between racist and sexist practices”. They are convinced that “all racisms […] annul the analytic differentiation of biology and culture and maintain that “[r]acism produces the fictive ethnos around which nationalistic discourse is organized”. Altogether, numerous predominantly theoretical commentaries are to be found which are concerned with intersections and parallelisms of the categories. Concepts which underscore the proximity of racist and sexist constructions of the other or which discuss racism as a model to understand sexism certainly remain relatively general. But they still point out that psychological mechanisms of projection have to be taken into account beside the social mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.
The connection of these categories is to be found bluntly in the philosophic-histori-
cal concept of progress developed by the Enlightenment. Despite a great many scratches,
it loses persuasiveness only slowly. According to it, human beings are the creators of
themselves. History is the process of the development of mankind by its own efforts; that
process must be understood as a sequence of differing stages of growth. On different
levels people produced varying economic, social, and political conditions, and corre-
sponding ideas. In this way, they worked their way upwards step by step. This applies
only for the species, of course. Due to their differing talents and abilities, not all social
groups are supposed to have had a share in this process. The possibilities of the indi-
viduals are graded in accordance with gender, class and race.

This view has found forceful expression in the philosophy of history and the race con-
cept of Immanuel Kant.30 In his lectures on anthropology, he synchronized the different
stages of human history with the different capabilities of men. This led to a hierarchy
of races.31 At the bottom were the American Indians. Kant ascribed to them redness and
attested that they could not acquire “culture”, that they had no “mainsprings”, that they
took care of nothing, and that their “love of freedom” was only “idle independence”. Above
these Americans Kant placed the Negroes of Africa. They had to be black, and their “race”
was said to have “passion” but without the possibility of controlling or channelling it. There-
fore they could acquire a “culture of slaves” only. They were regarded as “children” who
needed somebody to “direct” them. The Asian Hindus are ranked above the Africans.
Kant considered them to be yellow and conceded that they could be civilised. But, he
qualified, this was a “culture of skill”, not a “culture of science”. That is why the Hindus
must always remain “pupils”. At the top, Kant saw the “race of the whites”. They had all the
talents” essential for “culture and civilisation”; they alone could produce change
and progress; they were the only ones who could “obey” and “rule”. In the “race of the
whites”, “mankind” should reach its “highest perfection”.

Such sort of advancement is not offered for nothing. It has to be developed by sweat
and toil. Labour is considered to be the mode of progress. At the same time, Kant was

30 Concerning Kant and racism there is a controversial debate – cf. Robert Bernasconi, Kant as an Unfamiliar
Source of Racist, in: Julie K. Ward/Tommy L. Lott (eds.), Philosophers on Race, 145-166; Emmanuel Chuk-
wudi Eze, The Colour of Reason: The Idea of “Race” in Kant’s Anthropology, in: Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze
Malter, Der Rassebegriif in Kants Anthropologie, in: Gunter Mann/Franz Dumont (eds.), Die Natur des Men-
113-122; Joseph Pugliese, Indigeneity and the Racial Topography of Kant’s “Analytic of the Sublime”, in: James
N. Brown/Patricia M. Sant (eds.), Indigeneity: Construction and Re/Presentation. Commack, N. Y. 1999, 18-
31; Tsenay Serequeberhan, Eurocentrism in Philosophy: The Case of Immanuel Kant, in: The Philosophical
Forum 27 (1996) 333-358; Alex Sutter, Kant und die „Wilden”. Zum impliziten Rassismus in der Kantischen

31 The following quotations are from Immanuel Kant, Entwürfe zu dem Colleg über Anthropologie, in: Königliche
Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol. 15. Berlin/Leipzig 1923,
665-899, 877 f., and from Immanuel Kant, Menschenkunde. (Die Vorlesungen des Wintersemesters 1781/82
aufgrund der Nachschriften), in: Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Kant’s gesam-
convinced that by nature men were idle. In the beginning, all had been uncivilised; and even inside the civilised there still lurked a sort of clandestine savageness. Kant called it the “empty yearning” for “paradise”, where one could live in lazy dreams and pure pleasure. Men had to fight daily against this “inclination for idleness”. They had to take upon themselves the pains of labour which they hated. But reason would tell them that this was the only possibility of working their way upwards. They had to be the “creators of their fortune”.32

In these considerations, the hidden transformation of domination into self-control refers to all categories of social discrimination. Neither “inferior races” nor “lower classes” nor the “other sex” should be able to discipline themselves completely by means of reason. The possibilities of implementing this ideology are manifold. They become especially clear if the topic of class is questioned. The unequal distribution of labour and fortune belongs to the reality of class society. Idleness is the ideological euphemism for exploitation. The empty yearning for paradise is the denunciation of the longing of the poor for the lifestyle of the rich. Racism is the offer to the lower classes to project their despair onto so-called undeveloped races and by so doing to collaborate with the ruling classes; to get an admission ticket into an imagined cultural, ethnic, or national community; to despise their own social criticism and utopias as retarded and dangerous relics of uncivilised times; nevertheless, to squint at the assumed absence of rule and lack of self-control of the savages, and to hate them all the more in the longed-for and prohibited indolence and leisure attributed to them; to form a common body with those standing above them socially, politically and economically; to organise inclusion by exclusion in a racist social association.

Racist integration always unites belonging with contempt. That holds true not only for the free and independent Indian, the singing and dancing Negro, the opium-smoking Chinese, the happy roving Gypsy, and other stereotypes of modern racism. This also holds true for the general connecting together of racism and sexism. This did not begin at first with the development of the race concept. Even in ancient Greece there was “anti-female racism”. Even for Aristotle “the woman explicitly is a subman”.33 And even then women as the others of the family, slaves as the others of the economy, and barbarians as the others of the polity were designed according to a pattern which insinuated that there was a natural difference between all of them and the perfect human being. At the same

time, such lowering hindered neither erotic interest nor sexual encroachment. This was
directed toward foreign women and slaves as the differentiation between wives, con-
cubines, and hetairai demonstrates. Their own wives, on the other hand, were isolated
and protected by law against such persecution. A foreigner who lived together with a
female citizen could be expropriated and sold as a slave.

In the discrimination of the Jews the conjunction of sexism and racism lead to ob-
scure reasoning. Ancient derogatory remarks on the mutilation of Jewish men by cir-
cumcision were combined as a bloody obsession with medieval accusations of canni-
balism, ritual murder, and the desecration of the Host. Culprits confessed under torture
what anti-Semitic fantasies had assumed: that they needed the blood of Christians: to
staunch bleeding after circumcision by letting some Christian blood drip onto the wound;
to mix it with their meals as an aphrodisiac; to drink it as a preventive for menstrual pains
(which are to be found in both sexes because Jewish men would menstruate as well);
and to offer it as a sacrifice.34 Finally, modern race scientists had a long dispute about
the presumption of the hereditary circumcision of Jewish boys. Jewish men were con-
sidered to be effeminate and to share with women uncontrolled lecherousness. Ac-
cordingly, they were looked upon as being a lasting menace to the purity of the national
body.35

The interweaving of inclusion and exclusion, revealed here, is also to be found in other
dimensions of racist discrimination. That some of them were essentially including (as
with sexism for instance) and others fundamentally excluding (as with the concept of
race) is expressed occasionally. This opinion cannot be sustained. Racist ideologies
always proceed with distinction and incorporation like classism does. For example, within
the scope of different categorical systems, slaves are excluded from politics but included
in the economy. Even between nationalism and racism the relations are not unequivocal.
Among other things, the development of modern Turkey was accompanied by the con-
struction of a race ideology that tried to connect with the contemporary Aryan myth. The
Turkish theses of history and the theory of the sun-language established a racial, national
image. It brought the racist discrimination of the Kurds into line with their violently forced
nationalisation. Whereas literature, caricatures, jokes, and other media of everyday con-
sciousness continued the othering of the Kurds, politics pursued their transformation in-

34 Cf. Peter Schäfer, Judeophobia. Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World. Cambridge, Mass./London
1997, esp. 93-105 (ref. circumcision); the contributions to Rainer Erb (ed.), Die Legende vom Ritualmord.
Zur Geschichte der Blutbeschuldigung gegen Juden. Berlin 1993 (ref. ritual murder etc.); Manfred Eder, Die
„Deggendorfer Gnad“. Entstehung und Entwicklung einer Hostienwallfahrt im Kontext von Theologie und
35 Cf. Sander L. Gilman, Freud, Identität und Geschlecht. Frankfurt am Main 1994, 86-94 (ref. circumcision);
Klaus Höfl; Die Pathologisierung des jüdischen Körpers. Antisemitismus, Geschlecht und Medizin im Fin de
Siècle. Wien 1997, 164-232 (ref. feminization); Susanne Omran, Frauenbewegung und „Judenfrage“. Diskurse
um Rasse und Geschlecht nach 1910. Frankfurt am Main/New York 2000, 59-68 (ref. the comparability of
Jews with women); Claudia Witte, Artur Dinter – Die Karriere eines professionellen Antisemiten, in: Barbara
Danckworth/Thorsten Querg/Claudia Schöningh (eds.), Historische Rassismusforschung. Hamburg 1995, 113-
151 (ref. a bestseller on racial purity and its author).
to Turks by means of cultural and political oppression and without any concession concerning autonomy.\textsuperscript{36}

Ambivalences of such a kind are to be found in the modern race concept as well. The expectation that the racialised others would be completely separated from the self is already shattered by their widespread expropriation and by romantic projections and sexual infringements. Racialisation itself contains ambivalences, too. Even the rigid separation of Blacks and Whites soon proved to be flexible and was reflected by relevant encyclopaedia in differing headwords concerning “African Negroes” or “American Negroes”. The Australian Aborigines, originally subsumed under the Negro stereotype, suffered one of the most curious racist operations. It took place against the backdrop of the politics of White Australia and the so-called half-caste problem. With scientific support, the conception gained acceptance that Aborigines “must be classed as Caucasians”.\textsuperscript{37} It triggered off a vehement discussion on whether a “biological absorption” of the Aborigines would be possible by breeding out their colour or whether by an infusion “of aboriginal blood”, a “racial crime” would be committed.

Such and other similar amalgamations of discrimination molded by racism can be analysed concretely only from a historical point of view. On that score there is “a lack of historical reflexivity” not only “about the historical background to the emergence of modern racism”.\textsuperscript{38} It is about racism in general. Up to a point this is a theoretical problem. Far too many studies are concerned with definitions. Yet ideas cannot be defined, they have to be evolved historically. That is why theories should prove their efficiency much more emphatically than at present in historically orientated studies. The patterns of racist social association must be investigated at different stages of development, with a comparative and interdisciplinary approach to the racist elements in the different mechanisms of social discrimination.

\textsuperscript{36} Cf. Ismail Besikçi, Türk Tarhı Tezi Günes-Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu [Turkish Theses of History, Theory of the Sun-Language and the Kurdish Question]. Ankara 1991; see also Mehmet Özkan [i. e. Mamo Baran], Türkischer Rassismus im Nationalstaat Türkei am Beispiel Kurden, in: Kurdistan heute 16 (1995) 19-22 and 17 (1996) 36-39; the culturalist racism in the interior was combined with an outwardly racist macro-nationalism – cf. the summary of one of its propagandists: Ziya Gökalp, The Principles of Turkism. Leiden 1968, 19: “In short, the long-range ideal of the Turkists is to unite in language, literature and culture the Oghuz, Tatars, Kirghizes, Uzbeks and Yakuts once they have joined together under the name Turan”.
